Back to Inazuma

Inazuma docs · Devnet

Security & safe setup

Everything Inazuma does to keep its domain, DNS and RPC honest — and the short list of things you should check before you sign a transaction or serve public traffic.

Official domain

inazuma.network

Chain ID

7777

Keys

Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65

Automated tests

155 green

Disclosure

SECURITY.md

What is official

Three hostnames, nothing else: inazuma.network for the site, rpc.inazuma.network for JSON-RPC and explorer.inazuma.network for the explorer. Any other domain claiming to be Inazuma is not.

Inazuma will never ask for a seed phrase or private key — not by email, not in chat, not in a form. Anyone who does is stealing from you.

Step 1

Threats and the controls against them

The realistic ways a chain's front door gets attacked, and what is already in place.

ThreatWhat it looks likeControl in place
Domain hijackingSomeone takes over the registrar account and repoints the domain.Registrar transfer lock, 2FA, no shared credentials, auto-renew on.
DNS spoofingRecords are altered so rpc.* resolves to a hostile node.DNSSEC-signed zone, minimal record set, alerts on every zone edit.
Fake RPC endpointA cloned site serves an RPC that rewrites your transaction.Wallets must reject any endpoint not reporting chain 7777.
Lookalike domainsTypo or homoglyph domains phish for keys.Only inazuma.network and its rpc./explorer. subdomains are official.
Stripped TLSA downgraded connection lets responses be tampered with.HTTPS-only, auto-renewed certificates, HSTS on all public endpoints.

Step 2

Verify an endpoint yourself

One request tells you whether an RPC is the real chain and healthy enough to trust.

curl -s https://rpc.inazuma.network -H 'content-type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"inaz_nodeStatus","params":{}}' # expect chainId 7777, and finalizedHeight close to height

If the chain ID differs, stop — the endpoint is not Inazuma. Do not sign anything against it.

Step 3

Key hygiene

Most losses are key handling, not protocol breaks.

  • →Back up the key file offline before funding it. There is no recovery.
  • →One key per machine. Never run the same validator key twice — that is provable double-signing.
  • →Keep validator keys off laptops and out of chat, screenshots and pastebins.
  • →Use a separate wallet for day-to-day spending and testing.
  • →Exports use the Inazuma inazkey1 format — an EVM or Solana wallet cannot import it, by design.

Step 4

What is tested, and what is not

155 automated tests run on every change — unit, adversarial, property-fuzz and an end-to-end conformance suite that drives a real node from genesis. Here is the honest split.

AreaCovered by tests
ConsensusChaining, stake-weighted leader election, >2/3 finality, reorg ceiling, timestamp drift, halt/resume
ExecutionBalances, nonces, chain-ID binding, fee floor, staking transitions, zero and overflow amounts
NetworkingEncrypted handshake, peer reputation and bans, connection caps, node-identity pinning
MempoolNonce ordering, per-sender and global caps, fee priority, base-fee rise and decay
StateMerkle proofs, per-transaction and whole-block rollback, snapshot roundtrip, startup root check
ContractsWASM determinism, metering, stack and memory limits, native token supply accounting
RPCRead methods, admin-only gating, redacted topology, weighted rate limits, subscription channels
Load500 transfers settling exactly, 200-block continuous run, many-account root stability
FuzzingEncoding injectivity, signature mutation, constant-time compare, random transactions never panic
UpgradesHeight-gated activations replay old history unchanged; legacy signatures still verify

The suite has already caught real defects, including a transaction amount that could overflow a node's balance check and crash it, and an operator-only RPC path that was gated in one place instead of two. Both are fixed and carry regression tests.

Tests are not an audit. These are the gaps that remain, and none of them close by writing more tests:
  • →No external audit and no funded bug bounty — everything is self-verified so far.
  • →One client implementation: a consensus bug here is a network-wide bug.
  • →No machine-checked safety or liveness proof.
  • →Small validator set, so economic security is still low regardless of the code.

Full breakdown, per-category test list and the operational results from the live network live in docs/testing.md in the core repository.

Operator checklist

Run through this before you point users or traffic at anything.

  • [x]Registrar transfer lock enabled
  • [x]2FA on registrar and DNS accounts
  • [x]DNSSEC enabled on the zone
  • [x]Auto-renew with a backup payment method
  • [x]Only rpc.inazuma.network and explorer.inazuma.network as public records
  • [x]TLS auto-renewal and HSTS enabled
  • [x]Wallet verifies chain 7777 before signing
  • [x]DNS and uptime monitoring alert on any change

Report a problem

Found something? Open a private advisory on the core repository rather than a public issue, and include reproduction steps plus the affected height or endpoint. Disclosure policy and scope live in SECURITY.md.