Domain & RPC security

Threat model → controls

Domain hijacking

An attacker takes over the registrar account and repoints the domain.

Registrar lock enabled, 2FA on the registrar account, no shared credentials, auto-renew on.

DNS records are altered so rpc.* resolves to a hostile node.

DNSSEC signed zone, minimal record set, change alerts on every zone edit.

A cloned site serves a malicious RPC that rewrites transactions.

Canonical chain ID 7777 is published here; wallets must reject any RPC that reports a different ID.

Typo or homoglyph domains phish users for keys.

Only inazuma.network and its rpc./explorer. subdomains are official. Nothing else is.

Downgraded connections allow response tampering.

HTTPS-only with auto-renewed certificates and HSTS on all public endpoints.

[x]Registrar lock (transfer lock) enabled
[x]2FA on the registrar and DNS accounts
[x]DNSSEC enabled on the zone
[x]Auto-renew enabled with a backup payment method
[x]Only rpc.inazuma.network and explorer.inazuma.network exist as public A records
[x]TLS terminated with auto-renewal, HSTS enabled
[x]Wallets verify chain ID 7777 before signing
[x]DNS + uptime monitoring alerts on any change

Never enter a seed phrase on any site. Inazuma will never ask for one, and no official endpoint lives outside inazuma.network.